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Legal Notes
Harold Dudley Greeley, Editor
APPARENT AUTHORITY OF CORPORATE PRESIDENT

A question in the law of agency which always is of practical interest to
accountants was raised in a recent municipal court case in Ramsey County,
Minnesota. (Temple Brissman & Co. v. Greater St. Paul Corporation, not yet
reported.) The court on appeal held that the evidence in the case justified the
jury in finding that the president of the defendant corporation had been clothed
with apparent authority to bind the corporation in a contract for an audit of
its books.
The sole function of the corporation was the collection of rents from a single
parcel of property, part of which was rented by the corporation’s president in
conducting a drug business. The corporation’s treasurer recorded all financial
transactions of the corporation in books of account used in another and separate
business carried on by the treasurer. In 1926 and once again a few years later
the president ordered an audit and both of these audits were paid for by the
corporation. In neither instance was formal action taken by the corporation
through its board of directors or otherwise. In 1929 the president demanded a
third audit but the treasurer refused to pay for it. Nevertheless, the president
in behalf of the corporation engaged plaintiff to make this third audit and the
plaintiff did make it. Upon refusal by the corporation to pay plaintiff’s bill,
plaintiff sued the corporation and the president individually. It was conceded
that plaintiff’s charge was reasonable and the only question was whether the
corporation or the president individually should pay for the audit. The cor
poration contended that the president had no authority to enter into such a
contract on its behalf.
The court on appeal held that the president had authority to bind the
corporation. The opinion of the court cited Traxler v. Minneapolis Cedar
Lumber Co., 128 Minn. 295, 150 N. W. 914 which held that the president of a
corporation had implied authority to retain an attorney to defend the corpora
tion, and then stated, “We can see little difference between the contract in that
case and the one at bar. In both instances the president was acting to protect
the corporation.” But, the court continued, even assuming that the engaging
of plaintiff was beyond the president’s authority, the fact that the corporation
had paid for two previous audits was sufficient to bind the corporation to pay
for this third one. The powers of a president are not well defined but depend
largely upon the practice of the particular corporation. The court distin
guished the decision in Grant v. Duluth Ry., 66 Minn. 349, 69 N. W. 23. That
case held that the president of a railroad had no authority to bind it by an
agreement that it would pay any loss sustained by a third person upon a con
tract previously made by that person and the railroad. There the corporation
had never clothed the president with any apparent authority to make such a
contract. There could be no presumed acquiescence by the directors for the
president or any other officer to exercise such power.
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STATE INCOME TAX RETURNS AS EVIDENCE IN BANKRUPTCY

Now that congress has decided that our economic recovery depends in part
upon making federal income tax returns public records open to public examina
tion and inspection to such an extent as shall be authorized in rules and regula
tions promulgated by the president (National Industrial Recovery Act, section
218 h), it is a comfort to find that our state income tax returns can not be
obtained by trustees in bankruptcy, at least in the eastern district of New York
(In the matter of Hines U. S. District Court, E. D. N. Y., June 7, 1933, 89 N. Y.
Law Journal 3539, June 13, 1933). In this case a referee in bankruptcy had
ordered the bankrupt to give to the trustee an order directed to the New York
tax commission requiring it to deliver to the trustee certified copies of state
income tax returns filed by the bankrupt. The tax commission previously had
refused to give copies to the trustee. The New York statute provides that
returns shall not be disclosed, except in certain circumstances not relevant in
this case, but that certified copies may be delivered to “a taxpayer or his duly
authorized representative.” The federal court held that a trustee in bank
ruptcy was not a duly authorized representative of the bankrupt and reversed
the order of the referee.
The purpose of the secrecy provision in the New York statute was to en
courage frank and truthful income tax returns and to lessen the natural un
popularity of the tax. The provision permitting the taxpayer or his represent
ative to procure copies was intended solely for the benefit of the taxpayer or a
representative designated by him personally or a representative designated by
law to act for him and for his benefit or for the benefit of his estate. The policy
of the New York tax commission has been to recognize a trustee in bankruptcy
not as a representative of the taxpayer but as a representative of the creditors
and hostile to the bankrupt. The federal court approved of this policy and
held that the referee himself could not compel the tax commission to disclose
the returns nor could the referee accomplish the same result indirectly by
compelling the bankrupt to request the tax commission to disclose them.
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